This is more about the process than the feature set.

Torque moved out of open-source space a couple of years ago. This summer we are finally make the full shift to Slurm. I’m not going to trash the old thing here. Instead I want to celebrate the new thing and reflect on the process of installing it.

1. I haven’t researched the progeny of Slurm as a project, but the UI seems engineered to make this shift easier. There are tables all over the Internet (including on our wiki!) of the Torque<->Slurm translations.
2. Slurm’s accounting features were the trickiest part of this all to configure, but taking the time was worth it. Even at the testing stage, the sacct command’s output is super-informative.
3. SchedMD’s documentation is among the best of any large piece of software I’ve worked with. If you’re doing this and you feel like you’re missing something, double-check their documents before flogging Stack Overflow etc.
4. You can in fact do a single-server install as well as a cluster install. We did both, the latter in conjunction with Ansible. Neither is actually much more difficult than the other. That’s because the same three pieces of software (the controller, the database, and the worker daemon) have to run no matter the topology. It’s just that the worker runs on every compute node while the controller and database run only on the head node.
5. We’ve been successful in using an A –> AB –> B approach to this transition. Right now we have both schedulers next to each other on each of these systems. That will remain the case for a few weeks, until we confirm we’ve done Slurm right.
6. Schedulers have the most complicated build process of any piece of software I’ve worked with – except gcc, the building of which sometimes makes one want to walk into the ocean.
7. Dependencies and related programs (e.g. your choice of email tool) are as much a complexity as the scheduler itself.
8. From a branding perspective, Slurm managed to pull off an impressive feat. Its name is clear and distinctive in the software space, but a fun Easter egg if you have a certain geek pop culture interest/awareness.

This is has been successful up to now. We’ve soft-launched Slurm installs on our scientific computing servers. We should be all-Slurm when classes and researchers return.

It’s been a long time since we systematically updated our security measures at Earlham CS. I spent some time on that this week. I wanted to share some of the changes we made so that if you’re running a small-to-midsize network you might implement similar fixes.

The bare minimum

We’ve been using two critical and often unmentioned security measures already:

• physically locking down the data center
• running a network firewall

These two things alone do a lot to secure the system.

Securing services

Of course, we also provide a lot of services over the network, everything from web servers to shells. We have to secure access to all of those tools, plus our data. We want the necessary cracks in our firewall have as low a risk as possible of being exploited.

What remained, then, was the installation and configuration of server tools to harden security above and beyond physical locks and firewalls – in a word, “DevSecOps”.

First, on those machines that didn’t already have it, we installed unattended-upgrades (Debian/Ubuntu)/yum-cron (CentOS 7)/dnf-automatic (CentOS 8). We use these to automatically apply security patches to package-managed software. We’re still free to install larger updates each semester manually to minimize disruptions. It’s a good balance of stability and security vigilance.

Next we installed fail2ban on the small number of servers to which our firewall allows SSH access. It detects and blocks possibly-malicious IP addresses trying to connect to the servers. We enabled two “jails” in fail2ban: sshd, which catches likely bad actors attempting ssh connections and bans them for a short time; and recidive, which checks the log records from sshd (and potentially other jails), detects repeat offenders, and imposes longer-lasting bans against them.

(This is the digital equivalent of locking up your house so that the lazy would-be burglar going door-to-door checking knobs can’t get in.)

We then ran trufflehog on our public GitLab repos. It gave us a few warnings but none that actually contained compromising system or user information. I consider this good luck more than anything, and we’re taking steps now proactively to prevent such mistakes.

Still to come

Our next security steps will focus on improved monitoring and notification. This has been an issue in the past for stability, but fixing it will also contribute to security. We are also constantly reevaluating security approaches at a department policy level.

Thanks to this post for pointing me to some of the tools mentioned here.

We do a lot of upgrades in the summer. This year we’re migrating from the Torque scheduler (which is no longer open-source) to the Slurm scheduler (which is). It’s a good learning experience in addition to being a systems improvement.

First I installed it on a cluster, successful. That took a while: It turns out schedulers have complicated installation processes with specific dependency chains. To save time in the future, I decided that I would attempt to automate the installation.

This has gone better than you might initially guess.

I threw my command history into a script, spun up a VM, and began iterating. After a bit of work, I’ve made the installation script work consistently with almost no direct user input.

Then I tried running it on another machine and ran headfirst into SELinux.

The problem

The installation itself went fine, but the OS displayed this message every time I tried to enable the Slurm control daemon:

[root@host system]# systemctl enable slurmctld.service
Failed to enable unit: Unit file slurmctld.service does not exist.

I double- and triple-checked that my file was in a directory that systemctl expected. After that I checked /var/log/messages and saw a bunch of errors like this …

type=AVC msg=audit(1589561958.124:5788): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=1 comm="systemd" name="slurmctld.service" dev="dm-0" ino=34756852 scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

… and this:

type=USER_END msg=audit(1589562370.317:5841): pid=3893 uid=0 auid=1000 ses=29 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 msg='op=PAM:session_close grantors=pam_keyinit,pam_limits,pam_systemd,pam_unix acct="slurm" exe="/usr/bin/sudo" hostname=? addr=? terminal=/dev/pts/0 res=success'UID="root" AUID="[omitted]"

Then I ran ls -Z on the service file’s directory to check its SELinux context:

-rw-r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0                  367 May 15 13:01 slurmctld.service
[...]
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:systemd_unit_file_t:s0               337 May 11  2019 smartd.service

Notice that the smartd file has a different context (system_u...) than does the slurmctld file (unconfined_u...). My inference was that the slurmctld file’s context was a (not-trusted) default, and that the solution was to make its context consistent with the context of the working systemctl unit files.

The solution

Here’s how to give the service file a new context in SELinux:

chcon system_u:object_r:systemd_unit_file_t:s0 slurmctld.service 

To see the appropriate security context, check ls -Z. Trust that more than my command, because your context may not match mine.

Concluding remarks

I am early-career and have done very little work with SELinux, so this is not a specialty of mine right now. As such, this may or may not be the best solution. But, mindful of some security advice, I think it is preferable to disabling SELinux altogether.

I recently took a painful and convoluted path to understanding management of disks in Linux. I wanted to post that here for my own reference, and maybe you will find it useful as well. Note that these commands should generally not be directly copy-pasted, and should be used advisedly after careful planning.

Let’s take a plunge into the ocean, shall we?

Filesystem

You’ve definitely seen this. This is the surface level, the very highest layer of abstraction. If you’re not a sysadmin, there’s a good chance this is the only layer you care about (on your phone, it’s likely you don’t even care about this one!).

The filesystem is where files are kept and managed. There are tools to mount either the underlying device (/dev/mapper or /dev/vgname) or the filesystem itself to mount points – for example, over NFS. You can also use the filesystem on a logical volume (see below) as the disk for a virtual machine.

This is where ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, and more come in. This is not a post about filesystems (I don’t know enough about filesystems to credibly write that post) but they each have features and associated utilities. Most of our systems are ext4 but we have some older systems with ext2 and some systems with xfs.

Commands (vary by filesystem)

• mount and umount; see /etc/fstab and /etc/exports
• df -h can show you if your filesystem mount is crowded for storage
• fsck (e2fsck, e4fsck, and similar are wrappers around fsck)
• resize2fs /dev/lv/home 512G # resize a filesystem to be 512G, might accompany lvresize below
• xfsdump/xfsrestore for XFS filesystems
• mkfs /dev/lvmdata/device # make a filesystem on a device
• fdisk -l isn’t technically a filesystem tool, but it operates at a high level of abstraction and you should be aware of it

LVM

Filesystems are made on top of underlying volumes in LVM, or “logical volume manager” – Linux’s partitioning system. (Actually manipulating LVM’s rather that passively using simple defaults is technically optional, but it’s widely used.)

LVM has three layers of abstraction within itself that each have utilities associated with them. This closely follows the abstraction patterns we’ve already seen in the layers below this one.

LVM logical volumes

A volume group can then be organized into logical volumes. The commands here are incredibly powerful and give you the ability to manage disk space with ease (we’re grading “easy” on a curve).

If you want to resize a filesystem, there’s a good chance you’ll want to follow up by resizing the volume underneath it.

Commands:

• lvdisplay
• lvscan
• lvcreate -L 20G -n mylv myvg # create a 20GB LVM called mylv in group myvg
• lvresize -L 520G /dev/lv/home # make the LVM on /dev/lv/home 520GB in size

LVM volume groups

A logical volume is created from devices/space within a volume group. It’s a collection of one or more LVM “physical” volumes (see below).

Commands:

• vgscan
• vgdisplay
• pvmove /dev/mydevice # to get stuff off of a PV and move it to available free space elsewhere in the VG

LVM physical volumes

At the lowest LVM layer there are “physical” volumes. These might actually correspond to physical volumes (if you have no hardware RAID), or they might be other /dev objects in the OS (/dev/md127 would be a physical volume in this model).

These are the LVM analog to disk partitions.

Commands:

• pvscan
• pvdisplay

Software RAID (optional)

RAID is a system for data management on disk. There are both “hardware” and “software” implementations of RAID, and software is at a higher level of abstraction. It’s convenient for a (super-)user to manage. Our machines (like many) use mdadm, but there are other tools.

Commands:

• mdadm --detail --scan
• mdadm -D /dev/mdXYZ # details
• mdadm -Q /dev/mdXYZ # short, human-readable
• cat /proc/mdstat

Devices in the OS

“In UNIX, everything is a file.” In Linux that’s mostly true as well.

The /dev directory contains the files that correspond to each particular device detected by the OS. I found these useful mostly for reference, because everything refers to them in some way.

If you look closely, things like /dev/mapper/devicename are often symlinks (pointers) to other devices.

All the other layers provide you better abstractions and more powerful tools for working with devices. For that reason, you probably won’t do much with these directly.

(The astute will observe that /dev is a directory so we’ve leapt up the layers of abstraction here. True! However, it’s the best lens you as a user have on the things the OS detects in the lower layers.)

Also: dmesg. Use dmesg. It will help you.

Hardware RAID (optional)

If you use software RAID for convenience, you use hardware RAID for performance and information-hiding.

Hardware RAID presents the underlying drives to the OS at boot time by way of a RAID controller on the motherboard. At boot, you can access a tiny bit of software (with a GUI that’s probably older than me) to create and modify hardware RAID volumes. In other words, the RAID volume(s), not the physical drives, appear to you as a user.

At least some, and I presume most, RAID controllers have software that you can install on the operating system that will let you get a look at the physical disks that compose the logical volumes.

Relevant software at this level:

• MegaCLI # we have a MegaRAID controller on the server in question
• smartctl --scan
• smartctl -a -d megaraid,15 /dev/bus/6 # substitute the identifying numbers from the scan command above
• not much else – managing hardware RAID carefully requires a reboot; for this reason we tend to keep ours simple

Physical storage

We have reached the seafloor, where you have some drives – SSD’s, spinning disks, etc. Those drives are the very lowest level of abstraction: they are literal, physical machines. Because of this, we don’t tend to work with them directly except at installation and removal.

Summary and context

From highest to lowest layers of abstraction:

1. filesystem
2. LVM [lv > vg > pv]
3. software RAID
4. devices in the OS
5. hardware RAID
6. disks

The origin story of this blog post (also a wiki page, if you’re an Earlham CS sysadmin student!): necessity’s the mother of invention.

I supervise a sysadmin team. It’s a team of students who work part-time, so in practice I’m a player-coach.

In February, we experienced a disk failure that triggered protracted downtime on an important server. It was a topic I was unfamiliar with, so I did a lot of on-the-job training and research. I read probably dozens of blog posts about filesystems, but none used language that made sense to me in a coherent, unified, and specific way. I hope I’ve done so here, so that others can learn from my mistakes!

While reading through the early days of a pandemic, I discovered that someone made a list of Eight Fallacies of Distributed Computing:

• The network is reliable.
• Latency is zero.
• Bandwidth is infinite.
• The network is secure.
• Topology doesn’t change.
• There is one administrator.
• Transport cost is zero.
• The network is homogeneous.

I’ve seen all those assumptions fail personally. That’s with only a few years of experience running small distributed systems.

The originating article/talk is here.

The admins and I have just emerged from a few weeks of slow-rolling outages. We have good reason to believe all is well again.

I want to write more about the incident and the skills upgrade that it gave us, but I’ll stick with this for now:

We’re a liberal arts college CS department with a couple dozen servers. In other words, we’re not a big shop. Mostly we can see when something’s off with our eyes and ears. We won’t be able to access something, emails will stop going through, etc. For that reason, services rarely disappear for long in our world.

Once in a while, though, we have to trace a problem – like the last month, for example. Ultimately it was a simple problem with a simple solution (hardware failures, nothing to do but replace our old SSD’s) but we spent a lot of time trying to identify that cause. That’s mostly because we currently lack a comprehensive monitoring suite.

That’s getting fixed, and quick.

As part of a broader quality control initiative we’re working on, we’re going to monitor everything – hardware, software, networks, connections, etc. The overhead of maintaining extensible monitoring systems is not as severe as the overhead of tracing problems when those systems don’t exist. To my knowledge, this brings us inline with best practices in industry.

Yes, it’s just a couple dozen servers. But experience has shown: All sentences of the form “It’s just X” are dangerous sentences.